The Duties of Concurrent Owners of Oil and Gas Interests: Tenneco Oil Co. v. Bogert by Morrisey, Mary Kay
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 22 
Issue 4 Mineral Law Symposium 
Summer 1987 
The Duties of Concurrent Owners of Oil and Gas Interests: 
Tenneco Oil Co. v. Bogert 
Mary Kay Morrisey 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mary K. Morrisey, The Duties of Concurrent Owners of Oil and Gas Interests: Tenneco Oil Co. v. Bogert, 22 
Tulsa L. J. 563 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol22/iss4/5 
This Casenote/Comment is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
THE DUTIES OF CONCURRENT OWNERS OF
OIL AND GAS INTERESTS: TENNECO OIL
CO. v. BOGERT
I. INTRODUCTION
More than one person may own mineral rights to a particular piece
of property. Whenever this type of common interest in property exists, a
number of troublesome questions arise as to the respective rights and
obligations of the co-owners to each other with respect to the property
involved. Case law analysis illustrates difficulty in both defining and pre-
dicting the parameter of the co-tenant relationship. Nevertheless, courts
must at least provide some type of guidelines so that cotenants may effec-
tively fulfill their various duties.
Recently, many questions have surfaced as to the scope of the duties
between or among concurrent owners of oil and gas interests, especially
between operators and nonoperators. Does the operator of a mineral es-
tate owe a greater duty of loyalty to its nonoperating co-owners? Does
the duty rise to the level of a fiduciary duty? In Tenneco Oil Co. v. Bo-
gert I the Distict Court for the Western District of Oklahoma was called
upon to answer these questions and thus define the attendant duties of
concurrent owners of oil and gas interests. The court analyzed the vari-
ous theories upon which a cotenant operator of a unit well may be liable
to his fellow cotenants for failing to drill an increased density well or
share information concerning drainage caused by a well drilled on an
adjacent tract by the operator.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Summary of Facts
In Tenneco Oil Co. v. Bogert, the court was presented with a dispute
involving adjoining tracts of mineral properties in Oklahoma.2 The Cor-
poration Commission designated a single 640 acre drilling and spacing
unit (section 4) for the production of gas and gas condensate on a tract of
1. 630 F. Supp. 961 (v.D. Okla. 1986). Tenneco filed a motion to appeal this decision on
April 9, 1986.
2. Id.
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land located in Blaine County, Oklahoma. The Commission also force
pooled five common sources of supply under section 4 and designated the
defendants, Buck Drilling and Exploration, Buck Exploration, C. Paul
Buck, and Irene P. Buck (hereinafter collectively referred to as Buck), as
operators of the unit well.4 Buck commenced drilling a test well, the
Pavlu No. 1-4 well, in the southwest quarter of section 4 in August,
1973.1 As of October 22, 1973, Tenneco Oil Company owned about sev-
enty-six percent of the working interest in oil and gas leases covering
section 4. Buck, along with others, owned the remainder. Buck and
Tenneco Oil Company entered into an operating agreement in an attempt
to define the duties of the two parties. The agreement expressly required
Buck to drill the Pavlu No. 1-4 test well.6 Furthermore, the parties ex-
pressly agreed that liability would be several, and that each party would
be responsible only for its obligations.' Soon thereafter, the Pavlu 1-4
well was completed and continued to produce in paying quantities."
Section 3, the tract adjoining section 4, was unspaced at the time of
the agreement. While both Buck and Bogert Oil Company (Bogert)
owned a share of the working mineral interest in section 3, Tenneco had
no interest.9 In 1974, Buck commenced drilling the Mehew-White No. 1
well which was later completed as a producing gas well. 10 Buck's opera-
tion of this well was the subject of controversy among Buck, Bogert and
Tenneco. Tenneco alleged that the Mehew-White No. 1 well drained hy-
3. Id. at 963. These tracts of land are located in "Blaine County, Oklahoma, namely, Section
3, Township 18 North, Range 10 West [hereinafter section 3] and Section 4, Township 18 North,
Range 10 West [hereinafter section 4]." Id.
4. Id.
5. Id
6. Id. This well was drilled after Buck obtained a location exception from the Corporation
Commission.
7. Id. More specifically, the operating agreement contained the following language.
The liability of the parties shall be several, not joint or collective. Each party shall be
responsible only for its obligations, and shall be liable only for its proportionate share of
the costs of developing and operating the Unit Area.... It is not the intention of the
parties to create, nor shall this agreement be construed as creating, a mining or other
partnership or association, or to render them liable as partners.
Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id at 963-64. Although the section 3 well was drilled only 330 feet east of the western
boundary of section 4, Tenneco did not allege its illegality. Subsequent to the completion of this
well, Buck filed for and was granted permission from the Corporation Commission to create a 640
acre drilling and spacing unit for the production of gas and gas condensate which encompassed all of
section 3. The Commission further granted a location exception for this well. Tenneco did attack
this exception, however, inasmuch as they asserted before the court that the question of voidness vel
non of this order was not essential to its claims against Buck and Bogert. The Court felt it did not
have to address this issue. Id. at 964 n.2.
[Vol. 22:563
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drocarbons from under section 4.11 Tenneco also claimed that Bogert
and Buck knew of this drainage, and that they therefore owed a duty to
Tenneco to either drill an increased density well in section 4 in order to
counteract the drainage caused by the Mehew-White No. 1 well, or to
inform Tenneco of the drainage so that they could take corrective
action. 12
B. Issues of the Case
Tenneco alleged four grounds upon which either Buck or Bogert
should have either drilled an increase density well to counteract drain-
age, or should have informed Tenneco of the drainage. The only one of
the four grounds of liability which the court applied to Bogert was the
fiduciary duty which arose from a relation of mutual trust and confi-
dence.13 The court was also required to rule on the other three theoreti-
cal bases of liability advanced by Tenneco. The first theory that the
court addressed was whether Buck owed Tenneco a fiduciary duty of
good faith and fair dealing, as a consequence of the joint operating agree-
ment designating Buck's position as operator of the Pavlu 1-4 well.14
Next, the court was called upon to determine whether or not Buck
breached its implied duty of good faith, inherent in every contract, 15 by
failing either to inform Tenneco of the drainage or drilling an increased
density well in section 4. Finally, the court examined Tenneco's argu-
ment that Buck breached its duty as a "prudent operator" by failing to
protect section 4 from drainage.
16
The court refused to accept Tenneco's argument that a cotenancy in
an oil or gas estate imposes a duty on a cotenant who knows of drainage
from under the joint estate to take affirmative steps to inform his fellow
11. Tenneco's Brief in Support of Response to Motion to Dismiss at 3, Tenneco Oil Co. v.
Bogert, 630 F. Supp. 961 (W.D. Okla. 1986) [hereinafter Plaintiff's Brief].
12. Id. at 4.
13. Id. The court held that although the Bogert Oil Company had actually been operating the
unit well, Tenneco had stated no support holding that a "party employed by a designated unit opera-
tor to perform certain tasks related to the operation of a well thereby partakes of the designated
operator's legal obligations to the non-operating interest holders." Id. Thus, the other alleged
grounds of liability would have no bearing on Bogert as they were not in the relationship of operator
or non-operator.
14. Id. at 966.
15. See Codding & Sons v. Armour & Co., 404 F.2d 1, 8 (10th Cir. 1968); Ryder Truck Rental,
Inc. v. Central Packing Co., Inc., 341 F.2d 321 (10th Cir.), cerL denied, 382 U.S. 827 (1965); see also
S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 670 (3rd ed. 1961); A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CON-
TRACTS § 541 (1951).
16. Tenneco, 630 F. Supp. at 969.
1987]
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cotenants or to take compensatory action on their behalf.1 7 Tenneco
cited four Oklahoma Supreme Court cases which placed cotenants in a
relationship of mutual trust and confidence."8 Nevertheless, the court
stated that these decisions were not relevant to the facts and circum-
stances presented by Tenneco, and thus provided no support for the at-
tempt to create a fiduciary duty to drill an additional well or share
information.19
The court next found that the existence of a joint operating agree-
ment did not automatically presuppose that the operator owed a fiduci-
ary duty to the non-operator. Tenneco cited, among other cases, Britton
v. Green 20 as support for its position.2" However, the court distinguished
the case by the very language in the Britton case.22 The court stated that
the language in the agreement between the parties in Britton clearly cre-
ated an unrestricted joint venture subject to the substantive law of part-
nerships, and thus, the duties that accompany a fiduciary relationship.23
Moreover, the court noted that the the decisions in the cases supporting
the fiduciary duty claim turn on the rights and liabilities fixed by the
17. Id. at 965.
18. Plaintiff's Brief, supra note 11, at 7-10; see Rex Oil Ref., Inc. v. Shirvan, 443 P.2d 82 (Okla.
1967) (holding that the acquisition by one cotenant of a gas lease on additional acreage within the
spacing orders, adding such additional acreage to acreage entitled to share in production of the gas
from the well, inured to the benefit of the other cotenants to the extent of their undivided interest in
the original lease and the well thereon); Ellis v. Williams, 297 P.2d 916 (Okla. 1956) (holding that an
outstanding tax title acquired by one cotenant in order to gain an advantage over her cotenants
inured to the benefit of all); Burt v. Steigleder, 132 Okla. 217, 219, 270 P. 54, 56 (1928) (holding that
the facts revealed here warranted the application of the theory that a purchase of an outstanding
adverse title by a cotenant will be held in equity to have been made for and on behalf of the other
cotentants as well as himself); Arthur v. Coyne, 32 Okla. 527, 529, 122 P. 688, 689 (1912) (holding
that in scheduling a previously jointly owned lot in his own name, without the knowledge of his
cotenant, defendant committed a fraud because his intention was to secure the full title in himself
alone; and as a result of the manner in which this legal title was acquired, it inured to the benefit of
his cotenant).
19. Tenneco, 630 F. Supp. at 965.
20. 325 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1963).
21. Plaintiff's Brief, supra note 11, at 4-7.
22. Britton, 925 F.2d at 383. In Britton, the court stated:
[Cotenants] undoubtedly may, be their separate agreements, employ an operator to possess
and manage the cotenancy, without creating a trust relationship between themselves and
the operating agent.... But when, as here, co-tenants undertake to designate a cotenant as
operating agent, to exploit the cotenancy for their mutual profit, they become co-adventur-
ers in the enterprise, and stand in a fiducial relationship to each other and to the operating
agent.
Id.
23. Tenneco, 630 F. Supp. at 966. It is important to note that this case involves an operator
who became one solely by virtue of a written agreement, unlike the Tenneco case in which the
operator was designated as such through a forced pooling order by the corporation commission prior
to the written agreement.
4
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contract. 24 The opinion stated that the provisions of the operating agree-
ment between Buck and Tenneco specifically defined and limited the
"right to drill additional wells,.., but imposed no obligation on Buck as
operator to drill any well but the Pavlu 1-4. "25 Accordingly, the court
held that it could find no basis for reading into the parties' contract a
fiduciary duty obligating Buck to drill an additional well simply because
it had knowledge of drainage by the Mehew-White well.26
In analyzing Tenneco's next allegation, the court recited the general
principle of law that each party to a contract has a duty of good faith
performance such that neither party shall be deprived of the fruits of its
bargain.2 v Tenneco claimed that Buck breached its duty by failing to
drill an additional density well or by failing to inform Tenneco of the
drainage.28 The court found no proof to support the contention that the
parties bargained for and agreed upon an unstated obligaton to drill an
additional well.29 Absent proof, the court held that there was no evi-
dence to show that Buck did not perform its part of the contract in good
faith.30
Finally, the court addressed Tenneco's argument that because a
lessee has an implied covenant to develop a lease as a prudent operator,
which includes a duty to protect against drainage by the lessee's other
operations, an interest holder in a unitized section has an implied duty to
conduct operations as a prudent operator.31 The opinion concluded that,
although one court hinted that an operator under a voluntary pooling
agreement may have a duty to protect against drainage, the comments
were merely dictum and therefore not persuasive authority meant to bind
future courts.3 2 Moreover, the court avoided the question of whether the
Oklahoma Corporation Commission's designation of Buck as unit opera-
tor created a "prudent operator" duty to protect against drainage, by
ruling that the proper forum to address the issue would clearly be the
24. Id at 967.
25. Id. at 969.
26. Id.
27. Codding & Sons v. Armour & Co., 404 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1968); Western Natural Gas Co. v.
Cities Serv. Gas Co., 507 P.2d 1236 (Okla. 1972).
28. Plaintiff's Brief, supra note 11, at 11-12; see also Tenneco, 630 F. Supp. at 969. This allega-
tion attempts to sever the implied obligation of good faith inherent in every contract from the ex-
press terms set forth in the operating agreement which did not impose a duty on Buck to drill an
additional density well or to inform Tenneco of such drainage.
29. Id. The proof necessary to support this contention would ordinarily be found in the con-
duct of the parties and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the contract.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 970.
1987]
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Corporation Commission.33
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW REGARDING JOINT TENANCY IN
OIL AND GAS RIGHTS
In order to efficiently analyze the ruling in the Tenneco case, it is
important to first understand the basic concepts behind joint tenancy law
as applied to oil and gas rights. Tenancy in common has been defined as
a joint estate in which there is unity of possession, but separate and dis-
tinct titles.34 The relationship may be voluntary or involuntary. Thus,
the owners of an undivided interest in oil and gas rights are tenants in
common: each holds separate titles, "the only essential [common] ele-
ment being a possessory right as to which, all are entitled to equal use
and possession."35 As a result of the possessory right, each cotenant is
entitled to enter upon the premises for the purpose of exploring for oil
and gas.36 One cotenant, however, cannot exercise that right to the ex-
clusion of the other. Thus, where drilling results in profits, the produc-
ing cotenant must account to the nonconsenting or nonproducing
cotenant for his proportionate share of the return, less the reasonable and
necessary expense of developing, extracting, and marketing the
product.37
Historically, courts have shown liberal attitudes in construing what
are reasonable and necessary costs in the development, operation, and
marketing of oil and gas. The rationale behind courts' lenience stems
from the equitable principles behind the rule.38 The inherent unfairness
33. Id. at 972. The court noted that this would not be unfair to the plaintiffs because of the fact
that Tenneco and Buck were presently adjudicating several matters relating to this case before the
Corporation Commission. This matter, could thus be settled before the proper court at the proper
time.
34. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1314 (5th ed. 1979); see also De Mik v. Cargill, 485 P.2d 229,
233 (Okla. 1971) (examining the right to partition by cotenants).
35. De Mik, 485 P.2d at 233.
36. See Earp v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 167 Okla. 86, 89, 27 P.2d 855, 858 (1933);
Barton v. Cleary Petroleum Corp., 566 P.2d 462, 464 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977).
37. Earp, 167 Okla. at 89, 27 P.2d at 858; see also Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 F.2d 566
(8th Cir. 1924). The court in Prairie made the following statement:
[I]f one tenant is able and willing to develop the mine and extract the oil before it is entirely
lost and his cotenant is not, he should be allowed to do so without incurring the penalty of
accounting to his cotenant for the gross amount of oil produced; but since he may not
convert, to any extent, his cotenant's interest, he must account to the latter for his propor-
tion of the net value of the oil produced, which is its market value, less the cost of ex-
tracting and marketing.
Id. at 573.
38. Moody v. Wagner, 167 Okla. 99, 23 P.2d 633 (Okla. 1933). The court in Moody made the
following observation:
[Tihe tenant who keeps aloof and free from risk until the hazards have all been run and the
[Vol. 22:563
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of forcing the developing cotenant to bear the full loss if the venture
proves a disaster, has prompted most producing states to enact forced
pooling laws.3 9 Forced pooling laws both protect the state's citizens
from over-drilling and protect owners of adjoining mineral rights from
drainage, by forcing the non-consenting owner to accept administratively
determined fair terms.' Often these statutes are unnecessary because the
parties contract on their own according to their perceived duties. Typi-
cally, when a leasehold is concurrently owned, before beginning explora-
tion and development of the premises, the co-owners will enter into an
operating agreement specifying the rights and liabilities of the parties and
designating one cotenant to operate the property.4" These agreements
will normally set forth an "Accounting Procedure" which specifies
agreed upon charges against the joint account, the methods of calculating
costs and expenses, and the methods of calculating credits to the joint
account for the proceeds of the disposal of lease equipment and
materials.42
Even though the courts, the legislature, and the parties have at-
tempted to define and delineate the rights and obligations of concurrent
owners of oil and gas properties, the extent and character of the duties
continues to be uncertain.4 a The major issue appears to be whether or
not a fiduciary relationship exists between or among concurrent
dangers are all past, and then comes forward seeking to share in the profits of a venture he
had not the courage to join, and to the success of which he has contributed nothing, cer-
tainly is not in a position to demand that the court, in ascertaining what the profits are,
shall be cautious almost to niggardliness towards those whose capacity and enterprise have
made the venture a succeess.
Id. at 102, 23 P.2d at 636 (citations omitted).
39. For example, the Oklahoma legislature enacted OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1(d) (1981). This
section provides that where cotenants disagree on whether to drill, the Corporation Commission
may on proper application compel the co-owners to pool and develop their interests as a unit, shar-
ing the expenses and risks as well as any profits. The Commission is authorized to fix the propor-
tionate part of the cost, which contribution obligation is enforceable by the operator of the unit
against the nondeveloping cotenant by a lien on the mineral leasehold estate or rights owned by that
cotenant. See also Anderson v. Corporation Comm'n, 327 P.2d 699 (Okla. 1957) (discussion of why
an order authorizing the payment for a proportionate share of the cost of production or a presumed
election to sell did not amount to an illegal taking of private property for private use without due
process of law); Wakefield v. State, 306 P.2d 305 (Okla. 1957) (determining whether a compulsory
pooling order was a reasonable regulation under the police power); Amis v. Bryan Petroleum Corp.,
185 Okla. 206, 90 P.2d 936 (1939).
40. See 1 R. MYERS, THE LAW OF POOLING AND UNITIZATION VOLUNTARY-COMPULSORY
§ 801 (1967).
41. Id.
42. See H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS § 503.2 (1971).
43. See, eg., Rex Oil Ref., Inc. v. Shirvan, 443 P.2d 82 (Okla. 1967); Wilcox Oil Co. v. Schott,
327 P.2d 471 (Okla. 1958); Sharples Corp. v. Sinclair Wyo. Oil Co., 62 Wyo. 341, 167 P.2d 29
(1946).
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owners.44
A fiduciary relationship has been said to exist in every possible case
in which there is confidence reposed on one side resulting in domination
or influence on the other.4" Whenever a fiduciary relationship exists, the
fiduciary is prohibited from acquiring rights in the property or interest
antagonistic to the person with whose interests he has become associ-
ated.46 The term fiduciary has been defined as "a person holding the
character of a trustee, or a character analogous to that of a trustee, in
respect to the trust and confidence involved in it and the scrupulous good
faith and candor which it requires."47 Most courts have not ventured to
state that ordinary cotenants stand in a fiduciary relationship. 48 Never-
theless, a basic principle that the majority of courts have adhered to is
that cotenant owners of estates in land stand in a relationship of mutual
trust, and neither shall be permitted to act in hostility to the other in
reference to the common estate.49 There are no hard and fast rules on
how a cotenant can maintain the relationship of mutual confidence.
Thus, courts often impose their own duties on cotenants according to
what they believe to be fair and equitable under the circumstances.50
IV. ANALYSIS OF TENNECO
No standard rules exist concerning the existence and character of
44. H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL & GAS LAW § 510 (1971).
45. Pure Oil Co. v. Byrnes, 388 Ill. 26, 57 N.E.2d 356, 361 (1944); Albrecht v. Hunecke, 196
Ill. 127, 63 N.E. 616, 618 (1902); Rees v. Briscoe, 315 P.2d 758, 759 (Okla. 1957).
46. Rees, 315 P.2d at 762; see Rex Oil Ref., Inc. v. Shirvan, 443 P.2d 82, 87 (Okla. 1967).
47. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 752 (5th ed. 1979).
48. See generally Britton v. Green, 325 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1963) (indicating that there is no
necessary fiduciary relationship between or among concurrent owners but finding, however, that a
fiduciary relationship arose from an operating agreement made by the concurrent owners); Taylor v.
Brindley, 164 F.2d 235 (10th Cir. 1947); Tanner v. Olds, 29 Cal. 2d 110, 173 P.2d 6 (1946); Pure Oil
Co. v. Byrnes, 388 Il. 26, 57 N.E.2d 356 (1944); Zeigler v. Brenneman, 237 Il. 15, 86 N.E. 597
(1908); Dilworth v. Messenger, 121 Ill. App. 2d 250, 257 N.E.2d 573 (1953); Kentucky West Vir-
ginia Gas Co. v. Hatfield, 260 Ky. 315, 85 S.W.2d 672 (1935); Phillips v. Homestake Consol. Placer
Mines Co., 51 Nev. 226, 273 P. 657 (1929); Zimmerman v. Texaco, 409 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Civ. App.
1966), (there being no fiduciary relationship, lessee of one cotenant owed no duty to nonleasing
cotenant to prevent drainage or to seek a Railroad Commission order standardizing testing methods
so as to prevent alleged overproduction from other premises) error refd n.r.e., 413 S.W.2d 387 ('rex.
1967); Wainwright v. Wainwright, 359 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962); Smith v. Bolin, 261
S.W.2d 352 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953), rev'd in part, 153 Tex. 486, 271 S.W.2d 93 (1954).
49. See Rex Oil Ref., Inc. v. Shirvan, 443 P.2d 82 (Okla. 1967); Ellis v. Williams, 297 P.2d 916
(Okla. 1956); Wallace v. Brooks, 194 Okla. 137, 140, 147 P.2d 784, 790 (Okla. 1944); Burt v.
Steigleder, 132 Okla. 217, 270 P. 54 (1928); Arthur v. Coyne, 32 Okla. 527, 528, 122 P. 688, 689
(1912).
50. See generally 4 G. THOMPSON, ON REAL PROPERTY § 1801 (1979).
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the relationship between or among cotenant owners of oil and gas inter-
ests. One authority states that:
[t]wo situations give rise to most of the problems involving the exist-
ence and extent of fiduciary relations between tenants in common.
These are (a) the effort by one cotenant to buy in and later to assert a
superior title to the detriment of his cotenants; and (b) the making of
an agreement with the other cotenants, in which some advantage is
gained by "overreaching" the others.5 '
The case in Tenneco can be categorized as a dispute arising out of the
second situation presented. A number of previous Oklahoma decisions
dealing with this situation appear to have imposed various duties on co-
tenants according to what the court perceived to be fair and equitable
under the specific facts and circumstances. 52 The court in Tenneco did
not stray from this equitable concept.5 3 The court reached its decision by
examining previous Oklahoma cases and differentiating the facts of those
cases from those of the present dispute.
Tenneco Oil Company asserted that a general rule regarding the du-
ties of concurrent owners of estates in land had been established in
Oklahoma. The general rule would substantially state that:
Cotenant owners of an estate in lands stand in a relation to each other
of mutual trust and confidence, and neither will be permitted to act in
hositility to the other in reference to the joint estate; and a distinct title
acquired by one will ordinarily inure to the benefit of all.14
However, the court refuted this argument by recognizing that the facts
and circumstances of the cases cited were clearly different than those in
51. 4 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 605 (1954).
52. See generally Britton v. Green, 325 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1963); Frankfort Oil Co. v.
Sankard, 279 F.2d 436 (10th Cir. 1960); Taylor v. Brindley, 164 F.2d 235 (10th Cir. 1947); British
Am. Oil Prod. Co. v. Midway Oil Co., 82 P.2d 1049 (Okla. 1938).
53. The evidence revealed, and was not controverted by Tenneco, that the Pavlu 1-4 well had
produced hydrocarbons in excess of those produced by the Mehew-White No. 1 well. This finding
may have had some influence on the court.
54. Tenneco, 630 F. Supp. at 965; see also Rex Oil Ref., Inc. v. Shirman, 443 P.2d 82 (Okla.
1967) (holding that the acquisition by one cotenant of a gas lease on additional acreage within the
spacing orders, adding such additional acreage to acreage entitled to share in production of the gas
from the well, inured to the benefit of the other cotenants to the extent of their undivided interest in
the original lease and the well thereon); Ellis v. Williams, 297 P.2d 916 (Okla. 1956) (holding that an
outstanding tax title acquired by one cotenant in order to gain an advantage over her contenants
inured to the benefit of all); Burt v. Steigleder, 132 Okla. 217, 270 P. 54 (1928) (holding that the facts
revealed here warranted the application of the theory that a purchase of an outstanding adverse title
by a cotenant will be held in equity to have been made for and on behalf of the other cotenants as
well as himself); Arthur v. Coyne, 32 Okla. 527, 528, 122 P. 688, 689 (1912) (Syllabus by the court)
(holding that in scheduling a previously jointly owned lot in his own name, without the knowledge of
his cotenant, defendant committed a fraud, because his intention was to secure the full title in him-
self alone; and as a result of the manner in which this legal title was acquired, it inured to the benefit
of his cotenant).
19871
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the present case, and therefore, the duties imposed were irrelevant."
For instance, in Rex Oil Refining, Inc. v. Shirvan,16 the evidence
revealed that a cotenant of an 80 acre leasehold acquired by assignment
the leasehold in an adjoining 80 acre parcel, thereby giving him a greater
interest in the production from the one well drilled upon the 160 acre
drilling and spacing unit comprising the two parcels. The court ruled
that it would be inequitable to permit one cotenant to retain all interest
in the 80 acre leasehold assigned.57 Accordingly, the court held that the
acquisition was held in trust for the other cotenants to the extent of their
respective undivided interests in the original 80 acre lease and the well
thereon.8 The Rex court considered the theory that a cotenancy rela-
tionship is one of mutual trust and confidence in reference to the joint
estate and that a distinct title acquired by one will ordinarily inure to the
benefit of all.59 However, the court also recognized that the doctrine, "is
one of equitable cognizance and is not applied by hard-and-fast rules, but
in accordance with the facts of the particular case. '" 60  Other cases have
held that when one cotenant purchases real property sold at a bona fide
sheriff's sale under a judgment foreclosing a mortgage on the property,
pays fair and adequate consideration, and is not guilty of fraud, deceit or
collusion, the purchaser will be allowed the full benefit of his purchase. 1
55. Tenneco, 630 F. Supp. at 965.
56. 443 P.2d 82 (1967) (Irwin, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 88. The court stated:
mhat it would be unfair and inequitable to permit the plaintiff to retain all interest in the
lease covered by the assignment from Amerada to plaintiff and... that plaintiff holds the
same in trust for the individual defendants to the extent of their respective undivided inter-
ests in the Evans original 80 acre lease and the well thereon.
Id
58. Id. The court believed this to be fair in that the defendants were willing, and the lower
court's judgment provided that their interests in the adjoining 80 acre lease bear a proportionate
share of such lessor's reserved overriding royalty. Thus, the decree could not be seen as a gift.
Three members of the court dissented with this opinion, arguing that (I) there was no fiduciary
relationship among the cotenants, and (2) even if a fiduciary relationship was present, it arose out of
the property or interests common to the parties. Thus, a fiduciary relationship would have arisen
out of the 80 acre leasehold and not out of the other 80 acre leasehold acquired. Therefore, no duties
of the fiduciary would relate to the 80 acre leasehold acquired. Id. at 90.
59. Id. at 87.
60. Id. at 87 (quoting 20 AM. JUR. 2d Cotenancy and Joint Ownership § 70 (1965)).
61. Wallace v. Brooks, 147 P.2d 784, 789 (Okla. 1944); see also Burt v. Steigledger, 132 Okla.
217, 270 P.2d 54 (1928). In Burt, the court stated that,
"[t]he foreclosure was open, and both plaintiff and Shultz were parties. It would be a great
injustice to Shultz to hold that he could not buy for his own account. If he could not, then
he would be compelled either to allow the property to be sacrificed, if there were no bid-
ders, or with his own funds to buy for the benefit of the plaintiff as well as of himself. The
plaintiff then would only need to keep still and thus throw the whole risk of the purchase
on Shultz. Thus, an irresponsible person might prevent his responsible cotenant from pro-
tecting himself."
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The other cases relied on by Tenneco to support its proposition that
Buck and Bogert owed Tenneco a fiduciary duty arising from the coten-
ancy deal with fact situations similar to that in Rex. That is, situations
where one concurrent owner acquires an outstanding interest without
sharing it with another concurrent owner. This is not the situation in
Tenneco. Moreover, each of these opinions recognize that the facts and
circumstances of the case are controlling.62 The court in Tenneco held
that there was no authority or existing rule of law stating that "a coten-
ant in [an] oil or gas estate who knows of drainage from under the joint
estate has an affirmative duty to inform his fellow cotenants or take com-
pensatory action on their behalf .... -63 Quite to the contrary, the court
found that the general law in Oklahoma is that, "[t]here is no trust rela-
tionship between co-tenants as such - one is not the agent of the
other."' 6 In accordance with this finding, the court ruled that under
these circumstances Tenneco failed to establish a claim upon which relief
could be granted against Buck or Bogert.65
The remaining claims against Buck alone arose out of the joint oper-
ating agreement between Tenneco and Buck. The parties entered into
the agreement as a result of the Corporation Commission's orders force
pooling five common sources of supply under section 4, and designating
Buck to operate the unit well. Again, the ruling on these claims rested
upon the facts and circumstances of the case, and specifically upon the
language of the agreement.
The first of these theories of liability addressed by the court suggests
that as a consequence of the joint operating agreement, Buck owed a
fiduciary duty to act in good faith, and that by failing to drill an addi-
tional well in section 4, Buck breached its duty.66 Tenneco cited Britton
.Green67 as supporting its position.6" Although the Britton case ruled
Id. at 56 (citation omitted).
62. See Ellis v. Williams, 297 P.2d 916 (Okla. 1956); Burt v. Steigleder, 132 Okla. 217, 270 P.
54 (1928).
63. Tenneco, 630 F. Supp. at 965.
64. Id. (quoting Britton v. Green, 325 F.2d 377, 383 (10th Cir. 1963)).
65. Tenneco, 630 F. Supp. at 965. As was previously mentioned, because Tenneco's other bases
of liability had been found inapplicable to Bogert, summary judgment and dismissal of the complaint
in favor of Bogert were ordered. Id.
66. Id. at 964-66.
67. 32,5 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1963). The Tenneco court also noted that Tenneco relied on Texas
Oil & Gas Corp. v. Hawkins Oil & Gas, Inc., 282 Ark. 268, 668 S.W.2d 16 (1984), as a case support-
ing this proposition. However, the court found that the agreement in this case could not be differen-
tiated from the present agreement on the basis of its express language. Thus, it disregarded this case
in its analysis. See Tenneco, 630 F. Supp. at 966-67 n.6.
68. Plaintiff's Brief, supra note 11, at 4-7.
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that the operator had a fiduciary relationship toward his non-operating
cotenants, the facts and circumstances in Britton can be easily differenti-
ated from those in the Tenneco case. The Britton court held that there is
not necessarily a fiduciary relationship between or among concurrent
owners. 6 9 Moreover, they may "employ an operator to possess and man-
age the cotenancy without creating a trust relationship.70 However, co-
tenants, by separate agreement, may designate a single cotenant as an
operating agent, to exploit the cotenancy for their mutual profit, and thus
become co-adventurers. 71  Co-adventurers, as opposed to cotenants,
stand in a confidential and fiduciary relationship within the general scope
of the enterprise.72 In Britton, the defendant entered into various written
agreements whereby she agreed, among other things, to drill and com-
plete a well on each of the leases and operate the same to the mutual
interest of all parties ".... as economically as good business judgment will
warrant. ' 73 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant failed to properly
complete the wells by misoperating and mismanaging both leases.74
Although not expressly stated, the language of the agreement clearly es-
tablished the cotenants as co-adventurers. 75 As previously mentioned,
the co-adventurer relationship imposes upon the operator certain fiduci-
ary duties which were breached by the defendant's mismanagment.76 In
contrast, the language in the Tenneco agreement specifically denied a fi-
duciary relationship. The agreement expressly stated that:
[e]ach party shall be liable only for its proportionate share of the costs
of developing and operating the Unit Area .... It is not the intention
69. Britton, 325 F.2d at 383.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.; see also Eagle-Picher v. Mid-Continent Lead & Zinc Co., 209 F.2d 917 (10th Cir.
1954); Taylor v. Brindley, 164 F.2d 235 (10th Cir. 1947); Vilbig Constr. Co. v. Whitham, 194 Okla.
460, 152 P.2d 916 (1944); Blackstock Oil Co. v. Caston, 184 Okla. 489, 87 P.2d 1087 (1939); cf.
Brannan v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 260 F.2d 621 (10th Cir. 1958); Rees v. Briscoe, 315 P.2d 758
(Okla. 1957).
73. Britton, 325 F.2d at 379.
74. Id.
75. Tenneco, 630 F. Supp. at 966. The express language states:
It is agreed that Seller shall have active charge of the operation of said leasehold estate, and
that said premises shall be operated to the mutual interest of all parties hereto as economi-
cally as good business judgment will warrant. It is futher agreed that the parties hereto
will observe the spirit as well as the strict letter of this contract and work at all times to the
mutual advantage of each other in the management and operation and development of said
lease.
Britton, 325 F.2d at 381 n.2.
76. Tenneco, 630 F. Supp. at 966. This mismanagement included the alleged default in the
payment of a promissory note, and the failure of the mortgagors to efficiently operate the oil and gas
leases, to keep and maintain the mortgaged property in good state of repair, and to cure title defects
as required by the mortgage. See Britton, 325 F.2d at 379.
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of the parties to create, nor shall this agreement be construed as creat-
ing, a mining or other partnership or association, or to render them
liable as partners.
7 7
This language evidences that the Tenneco court could not possibly find
that fiducial duties arose out of an implied partnership. To do so would
be to hold contrary to the intention of the parties. Thus, the present case
is easily differentiated from Britton.
The court further analyzed the relationship created by Buck and
Tenneco through the joint operating agreement, and the duties that may
have been established had this agreement created a joint venture. Pre-
existing law established that the existence and extent of fiduciary duties
owed by parties of a joint venture to develop oil and gas properties is
controlled by the terms of the agreement between the parties.78  The
court compared Frankfort Oil Co. v. Snakard7 9 and British American Oil
Producing Co. v. Midway Oil Co." to the Tenneco case to illustrate how
Oklahoma courts have interpreted certain operating agreements.
The Frankfort case involved an action for breach of an operating
agreement which had created a joint adventure as to mineral leases.81
Upon finding that the agreement between the parties created a joint ad-
venture,82 the court accordingly held that the relationship so created was
fiduciary in character.83 The written agreement defined the relationship
between the parties.84 The court concluded that Frankfort had not
breached its fiduciary duty by withholding geological and geophysical
information because there was no contractual obligation to divulge that
information.8" Similarly, Buck could not be held to have breached any
type of fiduciary duty arising out of the operating agreement in Tenneco.
77. Tenneco, 630 F. Supp. at 963.
78. Id. at 967; see also Frankfort Oil Co. v. Snakard, 279 F.2d 436 (10th Cir. 1960).
79. 279 F.2d 436 (10th Cir. 1960).
80. 183 Okla. 475, 82 P.2d 1049 (1938).
81. 279 F.2d at 436.
82. Id. at 443. As with the other cases previously discussed, which characterized the relation-
ships as joint adventures, the court here also based its conclusion on the fact that the parties entered
into a common undertaking involving jointly owned property and a sharing of profits.
83. Id.; see also Vilbig Constr. Co. v. Whitham, 194 Okla. 460, 152 P.2d 916 (1944).
84. Frankfort, 279 F.2d at 443. The court stated that:
"[t]he extent and effect of such relationship is determined by the written agreements be-
tween the parties defining and delineating the powers and rights of each. In such a situa-
tion it is presumed that they delegated all the powers they wished to confer upon each
other and withheld all powers of authority not affirmatively delegated."
Id.
85. Id. The operating agreement provided that the nonoperator (Snakard) had the right of
access to the leased premises, of inspection of the log, of samples and cuttings from wells drilled, and
of inspection and audit of the operator's books. Frankfort had seismographic surveys and other
geophysical work done on the land. The court found nothing in the operating agreement requiring
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The agreement provided that the operator be required to furnish certain
information.86 However, Tenneco never asserted that Buck failed to pro-
vide them with information. Instead, it alleged that Buck breached its
fiduciary duty by failing to inform Tenneco of information of the drain-
age.8 7 As in Frankfort, the Tenneco court found that no fiduciary duty
was breached because there was no contractual obligation to provide
information.
Even if the drainage information was the basis for Buck's decision to
drill the adjacent well, no duty to Tenneco was breached by not sharing
the information.88 The court based this finding upon language stated in
British American Oil Producing Co. v. Midway Oil Co.89 In this case, the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma refused to find a breach of contract or a
breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the operator. Midway, as plain-
tiff, alleged that, while developing the area specifically covered by the
contract, British American, as operator, obtained information which in-
duced it to purchase certain leases, and therefore British American was
under a duty to Midway to permit them to join in the purchase of the
leases.90 The court could find nothing in the contract that would prevent
either party from acting outside of the area for his own benefit and thus
concluded that no duty was violated.91
In the present case, the joint operating agreement required Buck to
drill only one test well and specifically defined and limited the right to
drill additional wells, with or without the other's consent. It imposed no
obligation on Buck as operator to drill any well but the required test
well. 92 Upon analysis of the prior cases, the court, supporting a literal
Frankfort to furnish reports on geographical work and thus, no contractual obligation to Snakard to
divulge this information. Id. at 442.
86. The operating agreement guaranteed Tenneco access to all relevant information pertaining
to the development or operation of the Unit Area and provided that:
Operator (Buck) shall, upon request, furnish each of the other parties of copies of all drill-
ing reports, well logs, tank tables, daily gauge and run tickets and reports of stock on hand
at the first of each month, and shall make available samples of any cores or cuttings taken
from any well on the Unit Area.
Tenneco, 630 F. Supp. at 968.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. 183 Okla. 475, 82 P.2d 1049 (1938).
90. Id. at 1051. The court ruled that "[i]t is the duty and the right of competent contracting
parties, dealing together in the management of their properties, to provide their own terms as to
respective duties, and when they have done so, it will be assumed that no other duties were under-
taken or other liabilities intended to be provided." Id. at 1050.
91. Id. at 1052.
92. Buck's Brief in Support of its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint at 16-18, Tenneco
Oil Co. v. Bogert, 630 F. Supp. 961 (W.D. Okla. 1986) [hereinafter Defendant's BriefQ; see also
Frankfort, 279 F.2d at 440-41. In this case, the agreement provided that when notice of intent to
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and limited reading of the operating agreements, stated that it would re-
fuse to rewrite the parties' contract by finding a fiduciary duty obligating
Buck to drill an additional well merely on the fact that Buck had knowl-
edge of drainage by the Mehew-White well.93 The rationale employed by
the court in reaching the conclusion that the joint operating agreement
did not impose a fiduciary duty upon Buck to drill an additional well to
protect against drainage also appears in its analysis of Tenneco's asser-
tion that Buck breached an implied duty to act in good faith with respect
to the agreement. Specifically, the court again held that there was no
evidence that would indicate that the parties bargained for and agreed
upon an unstated obligation to drill an additional well or share unspeci-
fied information, or that the drilling of an additional well was essential to
accomplish the purpose of the joint operating agreement.94 The cases
cited by Tenneco as support for its allegation,95 merely reiterate the gen-
eral principle that, "[e]very contract imposes upon each party a duty of
good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement."
96
This duty is based on fundamental notions of fairness that neither party
shall do anything which will destroy or injure the other party's right to
receive the fruits of the bargain. 97 The fruits of Tenneco's bargain in the
present case was the drilling of one well by Buck and the disclosure of
certain information. Tenneco never claimed that these terms were not
complied with in good faith. Thus, the court concluded that there could
be no grounds for finding that Buck breached its implied obligation to
perform its contract in good faith.98
Lastly, the court addressed the question of whether or not Buck
drill was given and the other party elected to participate, the operator "shall drill," and that when
the election was against participation, the party giving notice "may nevertheless drill." The court
interpreted this provision to mean that the notifying party had the right to drill but, as operator, had
no obligation to drill. Id. at 440.
93. Tenneco, 630 F. Supp. at 969.
94. Id.
95. C.H. Codding & Sons v. Armour & Co., 404 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1968); Western Natural Gas
Co. v. Cities Serv. Gas Co., 507 P.2d 1236 (Okla. 1972).
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981); E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS
§ 7.17 (1982).
97. C.H. Codding & Sons v. Armour & Company, 404 F.2d I (10th Cir. 1968) and Western
Natural Gas Co. v. Cities Serv. Gas Co., 507 P.2d 1236 (Okla. 1972) acknowledge this doctrine, but
the fact situations are not even remotely familiar to the present action. Thus comparing the equita-
ble analysis of these cases was considered unnecessary. For example, Codding involved a determina-
tion of whether a duty omitted from the express terms of the contract could be implied from the
contract "as construed by the conduct of parties." In the Tenneco case there was no express provi-
sion dealing with a duty to drill an additional well, and no conduct that would in any way support a
finding that this would be necessary in order to accomplish the purpose of the contract.
98. Tenneco, 630 F. Supp. at 969.
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owed Tenneco a "prudent operator's" duty to protect section 4 from
drainage similar to that owed by a mineral lessee to a mineral lessor. As
with the other issues in this case, the court based its analysis upon the
facts and circumstances of the case. 99 In this instance, however, the
court sidestepped the major issue by holding that to whatever extent
Tenneco sought to adjudicate matters arising out of the Corporation
Commission's designation of Buck as unit operator, or its obligations to
protect correlative rights attendant thereto, the proper forum was the
Commission. "
The court ignored the Samson Resources Co. v. Corporation Com-
mission101 case presented by Tenneco as authority for its position, by
interpreting its comments as clearly obiter dictum."0 2 In Samson, the
court compared a mineral lessor's right to enforce a lessee's implied cove-
nant to develop a lease as a prudent operator and duty to protect against
drainage by the lessee's other operations, with an interest holder's right
in a unitized section to enforce the unit operator's duty to conduct opera-
tions as a prudent operator. 10 3 The Tenneco court interpreted these com-
ments to be merely words of consolation to the losers of the Samson
case." The court apparently believed that the Samson court was simply
affording the losers a glimmer of hope in that they may subsequently
prevail in another forum.'1 5 The agreement in Tenneco was a voluntary
joint operating agreement between the parties as opposed to a Corpora-
tion Commission's designation of an operator by a forced pooling order,
and thus, the Commission lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate this mat-
ter.106 On the contrary, the Tenneco case involved a forced pooling or-
der; and therefore, any Commission-conferred power to protect
correlative rights by drilling an increased density well must be adjudi-
cated by the Corporation Commission itself.'0 7
99. The duty of a lessee to protect the leasehold from drainage derives from the fact that the
lessor, by virtue of the lease, contracts away his right to develop and operate the property. 5 H.
WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 802.1 (1985). The facts in the Tenneco case reveal a
much different situation, in that Tenneco had as much right to petition the Corporation Commission
for permission to drill an increased density well as did Buck.
100. Tenneco, 630 F. Supp. at 971-72.
101. 702 P.2d 19 (Okla. 1985).
102. Tenneco, 630 F. Supp. at 970.
103. Samson, 702 P.2d at 23.
104. Tenneco, 630 F. Supp. at 970.
105. Id.
106. Id.; see generally OKLA STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1 (1981); Texas Oil and Gas Corp. v. Rein, 534
P.2d 1277, 1279 (Okla. 1974); Kingwood Oil Co. v. Hall-Jones Oil Corp., 396 P.2d 510, 513 (Okla.
1964).
107. Tenneco, 630 F. Supp. at 971-72.
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The Tenneco court did not expressly rule on whether or not the orig-
inal order designating Buck as the unit operator in section 4 conferred
upon Buck the duty to protect correlative rights by drilling an increased
density well. However, the opinion suggests that Buck would not have
this duty.108 The court bases this suggestion upon a statement of policy
issued by the Corporation Commission on May 3, 1984. This statement
announced the Commission's policy that all pooling orders relate only to
the well proposed to be drilled under the order and do not determine the
rights and equities of increased density wells which might be drilled in
the unit.10 9 Thus, it appears that a ruling on the possible liability as a
"prudent operator" would turn upon the facts and circumstances of the
case including the express language in the operating agreegment.
V. CONCLUSION
Issues similar to those presented in the Tenneco case have been ruled
on in other jurisdictions. All courts have held that there is no duty to
drill off-setting wells for the purpose of protecting the joint interest in the
minerals under the common trust from drainage, even though drainage
was occasioned by the cotenant's activities on the adjacent premises.1"
Further, the Tenneco court concluded that there was no basis for impos-
ing a duty upon Buck to drill an additional well to prevent against drain-
age in section 4 or to share information concerning the drainage. The
court reached this conclusion by differentiating the facts and circum-
stances here from those in other cases which held the cotenants to a
higher level of trust and confidence.
The Tenneco ruling does not hold cotenants to a high level of trust
as a fiduciary. However, special circumstances may reveal that a fiduci-
ary duty does exist. The existence of a separate agreement providing for
a fiduciary duty or an equitable complaint of fraud or bad faith may lead
courts to hold otherwise. Thus, cotenants should attempt to avoid these
problems by clearly and carefully defining their rights and obligations in
a written contract. The Tenneco case reveals that a fiduciary duty will
not be inferred from a contract absent special circumstances.
Mary Kay Morrissey
108. Id. at 971.
109. Id.
110. See Tanner v. Olds, 29 Cal. 2d 110, 173 P.2d 6 (1946); Kentucky W. Va. Gas Co. v.
Hatfield, 260 Ky. 315, 85 S.W.2d 672 (1935).
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